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RECENT DECISIONS
highest state courts and the Supreme Court held that such "separate
coach laws" were regulatory of intrastate commerce and therefore
constitutional.5 The long history of this subject evolving finally in
victory for the negro race presents a confused and ironic picture at
best. The earliest case on record, similar to the one under discussion,
was De Cuir v. Hall 6 where a Louisiana statute which attempted to
prohibit segregation of races in the state was declared unconstitu-
tional. As it was pointed out, while the law assumed to regulate
intrastate commerce only, it in effect would influence the conduct of
those passengers traveling through several states on a journey. Yet,
thirteen years later, when Kentucky passed her segregation statute
the Supreme Court held it was not unconstitutional,7 but that the
regulatory measure was meant to be purely intrastate. Certainly such
a reversal was irreconcilable. Cases which followed were disposed of
in the same manner,8 the Supreme Court holding: "* * * the con-
struction of a state statute by the highest court of the state is conclu-
sive in the United States Supreme Court." 9 It is for these reasons
that the instant case proves so interesting. Regardless of the deci-
sions of the high state courts, regardless of earlier narrow decisions,
regardless of contentions that the demand for Pullman seats by
negroes is negligible over this and other lines, the Supreme Court has
at last seen fit to render a decision which took sixty-four years in its
evolution.
G. M. P.
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS - CONSMERATION - PROMISSORY
EsToPPL.-The decedent, who was interested in the welfare of Hills-
dale College, the claimant here, consented to donate $1,000 towards
the building of a new library. The decedent signed the subscription
agreement in question with the understanding that two memorial
windows would be placed in the building in honor of his parents. The
the plaintiff, a colored woman traveling from New York to Tennessee. Held,
she was an interstate passenger. Law, intrastate in purpose was unconstitutional
as it sought to regulate interstate traffic).
5 Cand. 0. R. R. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 Sup. Ct 101 (1900) State v.
Jenkins, 124 Md. 376, 92 Atl. 773 (1914).
695 U. S. 485, 4 L. ed. 547 (1877).
7 Louisville, N. 0. & Texas R. R. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct
348 (1890) (with strong dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan: "* * * and where
interstate carrier laws exist within different states, the one requiring segrega-
tion, the other forbidding it-each is an infraction of the United States
Constitution, and both are unconstitutional.").
8 McCabe v. Atchinson, 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup. Ct 69 (1914) ; State ex rel.
Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74 (1892); Alabama & Va. Ry. v.
Morris, 103 Miss. 511, 60 So. 11 (1912).9 Louisville, N. 0. & Texas R. R. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct.
348 (1890).
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erection of the building has begun and is in progress. Petitioner,
the executor of the estate of Rivington D. Lord, brought these pro-
ceedings to determine the validity or enforceability of a claim against
the estate, predicated upon the agreement. Held, the subscription
agreement signed by the decedent is clearly enforceable on any one
of three theories. Firstly, the transaction shows the creation of a
bilateral contract, i.e., the decedent promised to pay a specified sum,
and the college promised to erect two memorial windows. Secondly,
the consummation of a unilateral contract may be deduced from the
implied request of the decedent to the college to proceed with the
erection of the library building, and its actions to this end. Thirdly,
the elements of a promissory estoppel are present since the college
sustained a legal detriment in justifiable reliance upon the promise
of the decedent, and it would be inequitable to permit its repudiation.
Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1941).
A subscription is a written agreement, according to the terms of
which the subscriber promises to furnish a sum of money, or its
equivalent, for a designated purpose.' A "charitable subscription",
as the term indicates, is really a gift 2 or a donation to a charitable
institution; the subscriber's promise to pay is not made in return for
consideration; 3 there is no thought of bargain or of exchanging prom-
ises as a juristic act,4 or of doing any act with the manifested purpose
of affecting the jural relation.5  Nevertheless, insofar as society has
an interest in the welfare of these institutions affected, and therefore
requires that charitable subscriptions be enforced, the courts in their
desire to enforce them,6 have undoubtedly relaxed the orthodox doc-
trine of consideration, 7 and have treated subscription agreements
'BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY 3171; BLAck's LAW DICTIONARY 1117;
BEACH, CONTRACTS (1897) § 205.
2 The mere fact that there is a condition attached to the receiving of the
bounty will not elevate the agreement to the dignity of a contract. Performing
the condition, or promising to perform the condition, is not a consideration for
the donor's promise, in spite of the fact that it may be argued that by perform-
ig the condition or promising to perform, the donee did something he had the
absolute right not to do. Consideration must be deemed the price paid for a
promise. Nothing is consideration that is not deemed as such by both parties.
There must be present a contractual intent. See Carlson v. Krantz, 172 Minn.
242, 214 N. W. 928 (1927); Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).3 WILLISrON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 116; WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (3d ed.
1937) § 53(a).
4 See ASHLEY, CONTRACTS (1911) § 40.
5 See BOWMAN, ELEMENTARY LAW (1929) § 51; WHITNEY, CONTRACTS
(3d ed. 1937) § 1, "An agreement vhich contemplates mere social or moral
obligations is not a contract".
6 "Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped, more or less sub-
consciously, the rulings thus made." Cardozo, Ch. J., majority opinion in
Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y.
369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
7 See Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown,
246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927) (concurring opinion). An extreme state-
ment is found in a Louisiana case. "In contracts of beneficence the intention
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either as contracts, or as offers to contract.
The first step towards the enforcement of subscription agree-
ments was the determination that parol evidence is admissible to
show the existence of a consideration for the subscriber's promise,
and also to show the acts performed by the charitable institution in
reliance thereon.8 In those cases where the decisions were based on
the law of contracts, the tendency has been either to imply a return
promise as the consideration for the subscriber's promise,9 or to imply
a request for the performance of an act upon the strength of the
promise,10 even though neither the return promise nor the request
for the performance of an act was expressed in the instrument."
Although it was intimated in I & I Holding Corporation v. Gains-
burg 12 that the equitable doctrine of estoppel is to be invoked in these
cases only when it is the court's policy to enforce the agreement, and
it is impossible to find the existence of a contract either bilateral or
unilateral, an analysis of the cases on this topic will reveal that al-
most invariably the existence of the elements of a promissory estoppel
moved the court to enforce the agreement, and not the presence of a
consideration. It is the changing of one's position by assuming or
incurring liabilities in reliance upon the subscriber's promise that
spells the obligation.' 3 Until there is an alteration in the position of
to confer a benefit is a sufficient consideration." Louisiana College v. Keller,
10 La. 164, 167.8 Barnes v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249, aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854) ; Presbyterian
Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889) ; Matter of
Taylor, 251 N. Y. 257, 167 N. E. 434 (1929) ; "* * * proof may be made of
the consideration and of such facts, attending the making and delivery of the
note, as are not inconsistent with the instrument', Keuka College v. Ray, 167
N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; I & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y.
427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
9 Barnes v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249, aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854) ; Keuka College
v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901); Allegheny College v. Nat. Chau-
tauqua Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
10 1 & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532
(1938); Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901); Presby-
terian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889);
Barnes v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249, aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854); Trustees of Ham-
ilton College v. Stewart, 2 Denio 403, 1 N. Y. 581 (1846).
11 See note 10, supra. "Nor need a request to the promisee to perform the
services be expressed in the instrument; it may be implied." Keuka College v.
Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901).
12 "That doctrine need not be applied to save a subscription where a request
or invitation that the promisee go on with its work can be implied from the
subscription agreement. It is only when a request or invitation to carry on
cannot be implied in fact that it is necessary to invoke that doctrine." I & I
Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
3.8 RETATEmENT, CoxRmAcrs § 90, "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise"; see WORDS AND PHRAsEs, Estoppel in Pais; Hazard v. Wilson, 22
Misc. 397, 50 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1898) ; Grange v. Palmer, 56 Hun 481, 10
N. Y. Supp. 201 (1890) ; PomERoY, EQuIuy JURisPRUDExcE §§ 804, 805.
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the promisee, the subscription agreement is treated as a mere offer
that may be revoked any time before it is accepted by the promisee.14
In these cases, the unilateral contract is said to arise when the prom-
isee connences performance as an acceptance, and the courts do not
follow the well-established rule of contract law that only full per-
formance of the requested act will be deemed an acceptance of the
offer."' However, the position of the courts is in accord with the
Restatement. 16
Insofar as the noted policy of the courts to sustain the validity
of these agreements whenever a counter promise of the promisee can
be implied, or whenever the promisee has sustained any legal detri-
ment in reliance upon the promised gift,17 is a wise and a desirable
one, it would seem advisable for the courts to state frankly that these
cases form an exception to the strict rules of consideration, and that
the doctrine, as applied to charitable subscriptions, has been modified
and qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.18
E. D. R.
COMMON CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TOWARD PASSENGER
UNDER DIsABILITY.-Plaintiff's intestate was waiting for a train in
defendant's subway station when he fell upon the tracks. A fellow
passenger and two station agents removed the deceased from the
tracks and assisted him to a bench some eight feet from the edge of
the platform. It was apparent that the man was laboring under a
physical disability, but when this fact was pointed out to the station
agent, he declined to take any action. Subsequently, plaintiff's intes-
tate once again fell upon the tracks, and this time was killed by one
of defendant's trains. Plaintiff contends (a) that the station agents
14 Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475 (1879) (subscriber's offer was revoked by
his death); Cottage Street Methodist Church v. Kendal, 121 Mass. 528, 23
Am. Rep. 286 (1877) (promisee had incurred no liabilities).
15 Peterson v. Pattburg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928); Sonino v.
Magrini, 225 App. Div. 536, 234 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1929); see WHITNEY, CON-
TRACTs (3d ed. 1937) § 34.
Is RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 45, "If an offer for a unilateral contract is
made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered
by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty
of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration
being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or if no time is
stated therein, within a reasonable time."
17 Incurring liabilities or sustaining a detriment in reliance upon a promise
is not consideration unless that act or detriment was requested by the promisor
as the price for his promise. See WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 45;
WLiSTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 112.
Is See Cardozo, Ch. J., concurring in Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua
County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 269, 159 N. E. 173 (1927); ASHLEY,
CONTRAcTs (1911) §40.
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